DOD TRADEOFF DA

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### Neg---DOD DA---1NC – DOD Tradeoff DA

#### US-Taiwan security cooperation is expanding now, but success depends on sustained US support

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Bilateral military initiatives are reportedly expanding, in accordance with the growing threat posed by China. Washington is reportedly considering using special operators to help Taipei to conduct irregular warfare, including establishing resistance networks and countering an amphibious landing. This could support Taiwan’s grassroots efforts to mount a whole-of-society defense of the island, integrating civilian militias with active-duty and reserve military personnel. Earlier this year, the United States and Taiwan signed a coast guard cooperation agreement. Taiwan is fielding coast guard vessels capable of carrying anti-ship missiles and envisions its coast guard as a second navy during wartime. Taiwan is also revamping its military reserve system. These are complex undertakings that would benefit from substantial U.S. advice and assistance — especially if they are to be realized this decade. Congress is also pushing for more tangible U.S. support to Taiwan’s defensive preparedness, beyond routine U.S. arms sales. The recently introduced Taiwan Deterrence Act and Arm Taiwan Act would authorize $2 billion and $3 billion a year respectively in foreign military financing for Taiwan. This could help Taipei to purchase relevant defense articles like survivable communications systems, coastal defense cruise missiles (including in shipping containers), small missile boats, sea mines, loitering munition swarms, and mobile air defenses. The Taiwan Partnership Act would establish a partnership between the U.S. National Guard and Taiwan’s military. Taiwan’s plan to spend an extra $9 billion on domestically manufactured missiles and other capabilities may also generate demand for increased U.S. military assistance.

#### NATO cyber-defense is enormously expensive

Sanger 16, White House and national security correspondent, and a senior writer @ NYT (David, “As Russian Hackers Probe, NATO Has No Clear Cyberwar Strategy,” *New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/17/world/europe/nato-russia-cyberwarfare.html)//BB>

At United States Cyber Command, which has expanded rapidly since the United States carried out cyberattacks against Iran in 2010, Russia’s networks are a regular target of surveillance. By next year, Cyber Command will have more than 130 teams fully in operation around the world, integrated into Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force units, in addition to teams that work alongside the National Security Agency at Fort Meade, Md. It has built up a vast early warning network, placing tens of thousands of “implants” — sensors that can also be used to insert malware — into networks around the world. But NATO is only beginning to explore what it delicately calls “active defense,” and says it is not focused on offensive cyberweapons. The Russians have no such compunctions. But it is unclear what Russian hackers hope to achieve here in the Baltics, other than to make the point, as they did in 2007 when they brought Estonia to an electronic halt, that they can get into any system, anytime. “Whatever the Russians have in mind — mostly intimidation — it usually fails,” said Estonia’s president, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, who grew up in New Jersey before coming here to turn this small NATO country into a pioneer in introducing new web-based technology for governing a nation. The 2007 attacks backfired, he noted, because they drove Estonians far more solidly into the European and NATO camps. In Sweden and Finland, neutral nations in the Cold War, the politics are more complex. As the NATO exercise began in Finland last week, the Finnish foreign minister was in Moscow, meeting his Russian counterpart, Sergey V. Lavrov. The more Sweden and Finland turn to NATO, the more their networks, their news sites and their government ministries come under cyberattack. As Adm. John Richardson, the chief of United States naval operations, said at an event at the Council on Foreign Relations in May, “The fact is it’s a pretty hot war in the cyber domain going on right now.” A hot war, but a kind that suits Russia well: It is part of what military strategists call “gray zone” combat. For Mr. Putin, cyberespionage and cyberattacks keep NATO and its partners off balance. They are enormously difficult and expensive to defend against, and, at least for now, they have operated below the line that is likely to prompt a military or economic response. “It stays below the radar,” Martin Libicki of the RAND Corporation told a conference sponsored this month by the NATO cyber center here, officially known as the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence. For the Russians, Mr. Libicki said, cyberespionage and weaponry are part of a larger strategy of information warfare and a blitz of propaganda that makes sorting out fact from fiction — say, the causes of the Malaysia Airlines crash in Ukraine — all the more difficult. But the attacks also remind the smaller nations here of their vulnerability, even if Russia’s troops stay on their side of the border. So far, NATO has found few effective means of deterring attacks.

#### Aid to Ukraine is the brink. It’s temporary reinforcement. But, doubling-down on permanent security cooperation requires a tradeoff with Asia. Turns the case.

Wertheim 22, senior fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is the author of “Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy.” “Europe is showing that it could lead its own defense,” *Washington Post*, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/03/europe-defense-nato-ukraine-war/>)//BB

Providing temporary reinforcements is the right decision today in the face of Russia’s bald aggression. But the United States should resist the inclination to revive its role as the military protector of Europe, especially since Europe is awakening to its responsibilities. Britain is sending troops to the Baltic states and Poland. France is pushing “strategic autonomy” for the European Union. And days after halting the Nord Stream 2 pipeline supplying natural gas from Russia, Germany reversed a long-standing ban on providing military assistance and sent weapons to Ukraine. Germany also vowed to spend more than 2 percent of its economy on defense, finally committing to meet NATO’s target. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared his country, and Europe, to have reached a “historic turning point.” Both Americans and Europeans would benefit if Scholz’s words prove true. In the coming years, European states should move to take the lead in their collective defense, and the United States should do everything possible to encourage them. To stake the defense of Europe on the United States, over the next decade and beyond, would be to answer Putin’s rash gamble with a slow-moving gamble of our own. It might seem as though the United States will remain able and willing to protect all of NATO’s 28 European countries far into the future. After all, America has orchestrated Europe’s defense for the past eight decades. Yet it did so under two markedly different conditions. During World War II and the Cold War, the United States sought to stop totalitarian powers from conquering the region. An Axis or Soviet takeover of Europe would have closed off the entire continent to liberal, American-style interaction and influence, and put the Western Hemisphere on the defensive. After the Cold War, however, as the Soviet threat collapsed, the United States recommitted to Europe not because the stakes were high but arguably because they were low. Threats were so negligible that it seemed U.S. leadership could keep things that way through modest exertion — and spread democracy to boot. Expanding NATO eastward, American officials convinced themselves that what had been a military alliance was more comparable to a political club, one that need not become an adversary of Russia. Russia’s assault on Ukraine ends that chapter and begins a new one. The prospect of further Russian aggression in Eastern Europe cannot be dismissed as negligible, as it was in the 1990s or 2000s. At the same time, Russia poses far less a threat to overrun Europe and threaten American security or prosperity than the Soviet Union did. After all, the Russian economy is roughly one-fifth the size of that of the European Union, and that was before the severe sanctions of the past week. Although Russia has built a formidable military, one that enables it to launch wars like that in Ukraine, NATO’s European members collectively outspend Russia on defense. During the Cold War, by contrast, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact boasted land forces superior in number to those of NATO (including the U.S. share), and the gap between its economic output and that of Western Europe was several times smaller than Russia’s shortfall today. In the security environment now emerging, with Russia menacing Eastern Europe, the United States is set to face major costs and the ultimate risk: great-power war between nuclear peers. Yet the threat Russia poses remains one that Europeans could handle themselves, with America acting as a supporter rather than the leader. The United States remains a superpower. Why shouldn’t it be the main counterweight in Europe to Moscow? There are two reasons both the United States and Europe would be better off if it declined this role. One lies in Beijing, and the other in Washington. The United States has already identified China as its primary rival, embarking on “strategic competition” with the world’s number-two power. Taking on China and Russia at once would be unwise and likely impossible. True, the Pentagon has previously planned to fight two wars at once, but those wars were envisioned as “regional” conflicts against small states like Iran, Iraq or North Korea. In practice, the United States had difficulty prosecuting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously. China and Russia represent challenges of a far greater magnitude, which explains why the Pentagon abandoned its two-war standard in 2018, even as its budget has grown. If the United States doubles down on European security while leading the charge in Asia, it may either fall short in both places or default on its commitments in Europe just when they come due.

#### Perception is key. Re-commitment to NATO at the expense of Asia triggers Chinese aggression against Taiwan

Sacks 22, research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, where his work focuses on U.S.-China relations, U.S.-Taiwan relations, Chinese foreign policy, cross-Strait relations, and the political thought of Hans Morgenthau (David, “Don't Pivot From the Pivot to Asia,” *Council on Foreign Relations*, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/dont-pivot-pivot-asia)//BB>

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, major war has returned to Europe and with it calls for the United States to prioritize countering the present threat posed by Russia over the threat China could one day pose. But Russia’s ineffectiveness on the battlefield, paired with the increasing investments European nations are making in their defense, gives the United States a better opportunity than ever to finally pivot to Asia and focus on the more formidable challenge China represents. A failure to do so could embolden China and give Beijing an opening to increase its influence, to the detriment of U.S. security and prosperity. Over a decade ago, President Obama announced the “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia in a speech to the Australian Parliament, declaring “the United States is turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia Pacific region.” The president’s speech followed an essay by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton entitled “America’s Pacific Century,” where she argued for a “strategic turn to the region.” All too often, however, the United States has failed to pair this ambitious rhetoric with policies that reflected the region’s importance. Now, Putin’s aggression against Ukraine has led to a growing consensus that the United States needs to view Russia as its primary geopolitical challenge and shift resources to Europe. But such a reorientation of U.S. strategy would again delay the pivot to Asia just when it is both more necessary and more viable than ever. The reasoning may be counterintuitive but holds all the same. The war in Ukraine has revealed Russia’s military is incapable of waging modern warfare and does not have the ability to fundamentally threaten NATO. Russia failed to establish air superiority over Ukraine, its logistics are in shambles, and morale among its soldiers is reportedly dangerously low. The defining image of this war thus far is of a stalled Russian convoy stretching forty miles on a road leading to Kyiv. Overcoming these issues will take years and require a fundamental overhaul of Russia’s military culture and doctrine. Russia will have to undertake these difficult reforms with its military in tatters. While it is difficult to know exactly how many casualties Russia has suffered in Ukraine, it is well into the thousands, and the Russian military will likely suffer far greater losses if it attempts to take Kyiv. Russia has lost some of its most advanced fighter jets, helicopters, tanks, and artillery, while depleting its munitions. It will take a long time for Russia to rebuild its material strength, a prospect that will be even more daunting given the sanctions that are in force. The crisis in Ukraine has also forced European countries to awaken from their slumber, and they are now willing to shoulder a greater burden for their defense. Most consequentially, Germany has announced it will increase its defense spending to 2 percent of GDP and purchase 35 F-35 fighter jets, which will increase interoperability with NATO forces. Sweden is also looking to increase its defense spending to 2 percent of GDP, while support for joining NATO has surged in the country. Denmark has pledged to meet the 2 percent target, while Latvia, Poland, and Romania have signaled they will boost defense spending to exceed that target. A depleted and exhausted Russian military and increased European investments in their defense mean the United States can meet its obligations to its NATO allies while shifting resources to Asia. As such, the Department of Defense should continue to identify China as the pacing challenge given its military might and its regional ambitions. Taiwan should remain the pacing scenario, as it is the most difficult one for the United States to address and therefore if the United States gets that right it will be well-positioned to respond to other regional contingencies. Capabilities most relevant for a Taiwan scenario should be prioritized, in particular long-range missiles and submarines, while the United States should continue to distribute its military presence throughout the region. With NATO’s conventional capabilities set to improve, once this crisis passes the United States should withdraw the seven thousand troops it sent to Europe following Russia’s invasion and review its force posture on the continent, where it currently has ninety thousand service members based. While Putin has upended European security, nothing has occurred since the war in Ukraine began that reduces the challenge that China poses for the United States. China’s military spending shows no sign of slowing down and is projected to increase by over 7 percent this year. It is continuing to invest in capabilities designed to prevent the United States from successfully intervening on behalf of its allies and is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal. China’s economy is set to grow by 5.5 percent this year and it is pulling additional economies into its orbit with the entry into force of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and ongoing Belt and Road Initiative investments. While the United States certainly needs to deal with the urgent threat to European security, it cannot lose sight of the more serious and multidimensional challenge coming from Beijing. Indeed, if the perception takes root that the United States is pivoting away from Asia and toward Europe this could prompt China to conclude it has a window of opportunity for remaking the regional order.

#### China-Taiwan war goes nuclear. Deterrence is key. It’s fast and more probable than European war.

Pettyjohn and Wasser 5-20-2022, \*senior fellow and director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Security, \*\*fellow in the defense program and co-lead of The Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security (Stacie and Becca, “A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear,” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-20/fight-over-taiwan-could-go-nuclear/)//BB>

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has placed his nuclear forces at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside parties to interfere in the war would result in “consequences you have never seen.” Such saber-rattling has understandably made headlines and drawn notice in Washington. But if China attempted to forcibly invade Taiwan and the United States came to Taipei’s aid, the threat of escalation could outstrip even the current nerve-wracking situation in Europe. A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC program “Meet the Press,” demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim of examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that China’s military modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal—not to mention the importance Beijing places on unification with Taiwan—mean that, in the real world, a fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear. Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway republic. If the Chinese Communist Party decides to invade the island, its leaders may not be able to accept failure without seriously harming the regime’s legitimacy. Thus, the CCP might be willing to take significant risks to ensure that the conflict ends on terms that it finds acceptable. That would mean convincing the United States and its allies that the costs of defending Taiwan are so high that it is not worth contesting the invasion. While China has several ways to achieve that goal, from Beijing’s perspective, using nuclear weapons may be the most effective means to keep the United States out of the conflict. China is several decades into transforming its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into what the Chinese President Xi Jinping has called a “world-class military” that could defeat any third party that comes to Taiwan’s defense. China’s warfighting strategy, known as “anti-access/area denial,” rests on being able to project conventional military power out several thousand miles in order to prevent the American military, in particular, from effectively countering a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Meanwhile, a growing nuclear arsenal provides Beijing with coercive leverage as well as potentially new warfighting capabilities, which could increase the risks of war and escalation. China has historically possessed only a few hundred ground-based nuclear weapons. But last year, nuclear scholars at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Federation of American Scientists identified three missile silo fields under construction in the Xinjiang region. The Financial Times reported that China might have carried out tests of hypersonic gliders as a part of an orbital bombardment system that could evade missile defenses and deliver nuclear weapons to targets in the continental United States. The U.S. Department of Defense projects that by 2030, China will have around 1,000 deliverable warheads—more than triple the number it currently possesses. Based on these projections, Chinese leaders may believe that as early as five years from now the PLA will have made enough conventional and nuclear gains that it could fight and win a war to unify with Taiwan. Our recent war game—in which members of Congress, former government officials, and subject matter experts assumed the roles of senior national security decision makers in China and the United States—illustrated that a U.S.-Chinese war could escalate quickly. For one thing, it showed that both countries would face operational incentives to strike military forces on the other’s territory. In the game, such strikes were intended to be calibrated to avoid escalation; both sides tried to walk a fine line by attacking only military targets. But such attacks crossed red lines for both countries, and produced a tit-for-tat cycle of attacks that broadened the scope and intensity of the conflict. For instance, in the simulation, China launched a preemptive attack against key U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific region. The attacks targeted Guam, in particular, because it is a forward operating base critical to U.S. military operations in Asia, and because since it is a territory, and not a U.S. state, the Chinese team viewed striking it as less escalatory than attacking other possible targets. In response, the United States targeted Chinese military ships in ports and surrounding facilities, but refrained from other attacks on the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, both sides perceived these strikes as attacks on their home territory, crossing an important threshold. Instead of mirror-imaging their own concerns about attacks on their territory, each side justified the initial blows as military necessities that were limited in nature and would be seen by the other as such. Responses to the initial strikes only escalated things further as the U.S. team responded to China’s moves by hitting targets in mainland China, and the Chinese team responded to Washington’s strikes by attacking sites in Hawaii. A NEW ERA One particularly alarming finding from the war game is that China found it necessary to threaten to go nuclear from the start in order to ward off outside support for Taiwan. This threat was repeated throughout the game, particularly after mainland China had been attacked. At times, efforts to erode Washington’s will so that it would back down from the fight received greater attention by the China team than the invasion of Taiwan itself. But China had difficulty convincing the United States that its nuclear threats were credible. In real life, China’s significant and recent changes to its nuclear posture and readiness may impact other nations’ views, as its nuclear threats may not be viewed as credible given its stated doctrine of no first use, its smaller but burgeoning nuclear arsenal, and lack of experience making nuclear threats. This may push China to preemptively detonate a nuclear weapon to reinforce the credibility of its warning. China might also resort to a demonstration of its nuclear might because of constraints on its long-range conventional strike capabilities. Five years from now, the PLA still will have a very limited ability to launch conventional attacks beyond locations in the “second island chain” in the Pacific; namely, Guam and Palau. Unable to strike the U.S. homeland with conventional weapons, China would struggle to impose costs on the American people. Up until a certain point in the game, the U.S. team felt its larger nuclear arsenal was sufficient to deter escalation and did not fully appreciate the seriousness of China’s threats. As a result, China felt it needed to escalate significantly to send a message that the U.S. homeland could be at risk if Washington did not back down. Despite China’s stated “no-first use” nuclear policy, the war game resulted in Beijing detonating a nuclear weapon off the coast of Hawaii as a demonstration. The attack caused relatively little destruction, as the electromagnetic pulse only damaged the electronics of ships in the immediate vicinity but did not directly impact the U.S. state. The war game ended before the U.S. team could respond, but it is likely that the first use of a nuclear weapon since World War II would have provoked a response. The most likely paths to nuclear escalation in a fight between the United States and China are different from those that were most likely during the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States feared a massive, bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack, which would precipitate a full-scale strategic exchange. In a confrontation over Taiwan, however, Beijing could employ nuclear weapons in a more limited way to signal resolve or to improve its chances of winning on the battlefield. It is unclear how a war would proceed after that kind of limited nuclear use and whether the United States could de-escalate the situation while still achieving its objectives. AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION The clear lesson from the war game is that the United States needs to strengthen its conventional capabilities in the Indo-Pacific to ensure that China never views an invasion of Taiwan as a prudent tactical move. To do so, the United States will need to commit to maintaining its conventional military superiority by expanding its stockpiles of long-range munitions and investing in undersea capabilities. Washington must also be able to conduct offensive operations inside the first and second island chains even while under attack. This will require access to new bases to distribute U.S. forces, enhance their survivability, and ensure that they can effectively defend Taiwan in the face of China’s attacks. Moreover, the United States needs to develop an integrated network of partners willing to contribute to Taiwan’s defense. Allies are an asymmetric advantage: the United States has them, and China does not. The United States should deepen strategic and operational planning with key partners to send a strong signal of resolve to China. As part of these planning efforts, the United States and its allies will need to develop war-winning military strategies that do not cross Chinese red-lines. The game highlighted just how difficult this task may be; what it did not highlight is the complexity of developing military strategies that integrate the strategic objectives and military capacities of multiple nations. Moving forward, military planners in the United States and in Washington’s allies and partners must grapple with the fact that, in a conflict over Taiwan, China would consider all conventional and nuclear options to be on the table. And the United States is running out of time to strengthen deterrence and keep China from believing an invasion of Taiwan could be successful. The biggest risk is that Washington and its friends choose not to seize the moment and act: a year or two from now, it might already be too late.

### Neg---DOD DA---U---Assistance High

#### US-Taiwan defense cooperation is high now

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The United States has a nasty habit of firing resources at a military problem first and asking questions about effective implementation later — as recently demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan — but that does not have to be the case with Taiwan. U.S. officials are starting to get more serious about supporting Taiwan’s ability to defend itself. They debate competing policy stances on defending Taiwan (ambiguity versus clarity) but largely agree that “bolstering Taiwan’s self-defenses is an urgent task and an essential feature of deterrence,” as recently stated by the Pentagon’s top official for Asia. Experienced U.S. officials are raising the alarm that China may attempt forceful unification with Taiwan later this decade if deterrence continues to erode. In the 1970s, the United States used triangular diplomacy to gain leverage over the Soviet Union by opening relations with China and eventually switching diplomatic recognition from Taipei, which Washington had previously recognized as the seat of the legitimate Chinese state and government, to Beijing. Prior to this switch in 1979, the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group-Taiwan was the central hub for planning, coordinating, and executing defense cooperation initiatives. It served as the eyes, ears, and voice of the U.S. military to the Taiwanese armed forces. It possessed the requisite staff and planning horsepower to facilitate the large-scale military arms transfers, training, and advising that contributed to decades of Taiwanese military superiority over China, which has since evaporated. U.S.-Taiwanese defense initiatives are ramping up — to levels unseen since 1979 — due to legitimate concerns about Chinese designs on the island. However, the thick military organizational connective tissue that existed prior to 1979 is no longer in place to facilitate this cooperation. Without a military organization focused on the island, the U.S. personnel, funding, and materiel poured into supporting Taiwan may be inefficiently applied and generate limited return on investment — defined in terms of deterrence and lethality in conflict. To help to deter Chinese aggression, the United States should establish a 21st century version of this often forgotten advisory group to provide the staff capacity, synchronization, and interagency integration required to facilitate increasingly robust U.S.-Taiwanese military collaboration, bolster Taiwan’s defenses, and strengthen its will to fight. Despite inevitable Chinese government counterpressure, reestablishing this organization would probably not trigger military conflict and would be consistent with the U.S. commitment to the One China policy, guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances.

### Neg---DOD DA---U---Resolve High Now

#### Resolve high now, because Biden is prioritizing Asia above Europe

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Until this week, the so-called “pivot to Asia” by the United States had been more of a threat than a reality for Europe. But that changed when the Biden administration announced a new defense alliance against China that has left Europe facing an implicit question: Which side are you on? It is a question that European leaders have studiously sought to avoid since former President Barack Obama first articulated that America should “pivot” resources and attention to Asia as part of its rivalry with China. European leaders hoped that the relationship between the two superpowers could remain stable and that Europe could balance its interests between the two. Then the Trump administration sharply raised the temperature with China with tariffs and other trade barriers. And now the Biden administration on Wednesday announced an alliance between the United States, Britain and Australia that would help Australia deploy nuclear-powered submarines in the Pacific — and, in doing so, also tore up a $66 billion deal for Australia to buy a French fleet of diesel-powered subs. “Europeans want to defer the moment of truth, to not make a choice between the two,” said Thomas Gomart, director of the French Institute of International Relations, or IFRI. “The Biden administration, like the Trump one, is provoking the moment of choice.” France was enraged. Yet if it was a humiliation — as well as the cancellation of a lucrative defense deal — it possibly did have a silver lining for France’s broader goals. President Emmanuel Macron of France has been Europe’s loudest proponent of “strategic autonomy,” the idea that Europe needs to retain a balanced approach to the United States and China. “We must survive on our own, as others do,” said Josep Borrell Fontelles, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, echoing the French line. The French embarrassment — the Americans also announced the submarine deal with little if any warning — came after the disastrous fall of Afghanistan. European allies were furious with the Biden administration, blaming the Americans for acting with little or no consultation and feeding Mr. Macron’s argument that the United States is no longer an entirely reliable security partner. “The submarines and Afghanistan, it reinforces the French narrative that you can’t trust the Americans,” said Ulrich Speck of the German Marshall Fund in Berlin. Emmanuel Macron’s Second Term as President of France With the reelection of Emmanuel Macron, French voters favored his promise of stability over the temptation of an extremist lurch. Cabinet: President Macron’s new government combines continuity with change, as newcomers at the foreign and education ministries join first-term veterans. New Prime Minister: Élisabeth Borne, the minister of labor who previously was in charge of the environment, will be the second woman to hold the post in France. Overcoming Tragedy: Ms. Borne’s father, a World War II resistance member and a Holocaust survivor, killed himself when she was 11, an experience she has rarely discussed in public. Rape Allegations: Two women have accused Damien Abad, the newly appointed minister for solidarity and for disabled people, of raping them. Mr. Abad has denied the allegations. But whether France will succeed in turning this bilateral defeat into a way to promote strategic autonomy is doubtful, analysts suggest. “Many Europeans will see this as a transparent way for the French to leverage their own interests,” said Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House, the London-based research institution. Even so, there seems little doubt that Europe’s balancing act is becoming trickier to maintain. “Europe needs to think hard about where it sits and what it does,” said Rosa Balfour, director of Carnegie Europe. A Europe that spends more on defense is to be desired, but it also needs allies — including Britain and the United States, she said. And a Europe that does more to build its own security capacity “is the best way to be listened to more by its partners,” she added. The new alliance, known as AUKUS, is an effort to integrate Australia and Britain into the broader American effort to create a security deterrent to China. For Australia, which has seen its once-strong relations with Beijing deteriorate, America and Britain provide a much stouter deterrent to China in the Indo-Pacific, analysts agree, than could the deal with France. “It’s sending a very big signal to Beijing, which is useful for the U.S., but especially useful to Australia,” said Ian Lesser, acting director of the German Marshall Fund and head of its Brussels office. “And the weight of that signal is important because of who the partners are.”

### Neg---DOD DA---U---AT Ukraine

#### China is top-priority now

Ferguson 6-5-2022, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and the founder of Greenmantle, an advisory firm (Niall, “Dust Off That Dirty Word Detente and Engage With China,” *Bloomberg*, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-06-05/niall-ferguson-on-china-biden-should-dust-off-the-word-detente>)

The most remarkable thing about the foreign policy of the Biden administration is that helping Ukraine defeat Russia is not even its top priority. “Even as President Putin’s war continues,” declared Secretary of State Antony Blinken in a speech at George Washington University on May 26, “we will remain focused on the most serious long-term challenge to the international order — and that’s posed by the People’s Republic of China.” Blinken’s speech repays close study. About one-tenth of it was conciliatory. “We are not looking for conflict or a new Cold War,” he declared. “We do not seek to transform China’s political system. … We will engage constructively with China wherever we can.” But the rest was as hawkish a speech on China as the one delivered by then Vice President Mike Pence in October 2018, which for me was the moment Cold War II got going in earnest. In Blinken’s words: Under President Xi, the ruling Chinese Communist Party has become more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad. We see that in how Beijing has perfected mass surveillance within China and exported that technology to more than 80 countries; how its advancing unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea, undermining peace and security, freedom of navigation, and commerce; how it’s circumventing or breaking trade rules … and how it purports to champion sovereignty and territorial integrity while standing with governments that brazenly violate them. Blinken spelled out how the US intends to “shape the strategic environment around Beijing,” citing the new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, announced by Biden on his recent Asia tour, and the Quad of the US, Australia, India and Japan, with its new Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, not forgetting AUKUS, the US deal on nuclear submarines with Australia and the UK. But the most startling lines in Blinken’s speech were the ones on “the genocide and crimes against humanity happening in the Xinjiang region”; on US support for “Tibet, where the authorities continue to wage a brutal campaign against Tibetans and their culture, language, and religious traditions”; on Hong Kong, “where the Chinese Communist Party has imposed harsh anti-democratic measures under the guise of national security”; on “Beijing’s aggressive and unlawful activities in the South and East China Seas”; and — the coup de grace from a Chinese vantage point — on “Beijing’s growing coercion” and “increasingly provocative rhetoric and activity” toward Taiwan. The response of the Chinese Foreign Ministry to this confrontational speech was, I thought, surprisingly restrained. Taiwan is, of course, the key issue. As if to confirm Xi Jinping’s darkest suspicions, Biden went off script again at a press conference in Tokyo with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on May 23. A reporter asked if the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. “Yes,” the president answered. “That’s the commitment we made. We agree with a one-China policy. We've signed on to it and all the intended agreements made from there. But the idea that, that it (Taiwan) can be taken by force, just taken by force, is just not, is just not appropriate.”

#### Aid to Ukraine doesn’t trigger perception of abandonment in Asia, yet. But, further moves to solidify US presence in Europe would

Walker 22, nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a former staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee (Dustin, “Biden Must Do Better Than Obama on Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/27/biden-obama-russia-ukraine-military-strategy-nato/>)

The Winter Olympics are just around the corner. Russian President Vladimir Putin has Ukraine on his mind. In Washington, the Pentagon is preparing a new defense strategy that looks beyond the Middle East to focus on the Pacific and China. The White House, meanwhile, is concerned about costs and wants to rein in military spending. Sound familiar? Well, this is exactly what the world looked like once before—in 2014. When the Obama administration’s defense strategy was released in March 2014, the document was obsolete the day it was published. It did not mention Ukraine, even though Putin’s little green men had already seized Crimea. It did not mention the Islamic State by name, though the group’s fighters had already captured Fallujah. With the defense budget under spending caps and the threat of sequestration, the Pentagon had to spend tens of billions of dollars in contingency funds to rebuild European deterrence following Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukraine and to defeat the Islamic State in the Middle East. Meanwhile, the Obama administration’s attempt to pivot to Asia stalled, and the U.S. military edge over China continued to shrink. As history threatens to repeat itself, U.S. President Joe Biden—who served under Barack Obama as vice president—looks perilously close to following in his predecessor’s footsteps. Biden faces the same question as in 2014: How can the United States stay focused on China while dealing with the crisis in Ukraine? Just as it was then, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific and countering China will not be strategically effective or politically sustainable if it is premised on sacrificing the commitment to credible NATO deterrence and defense. But given finite resources, the United States cannot confront China, the most powerful adversary it has ever faced, without substantially changing how it achieves strategic ends in Europe—especially when it comes to military power. That’s not just an urgent strategic question to answer now, as Washington decides how to deal with Russia’s threatened invasion of Ukraine. It also needs to be at the core of the Pentagon’s strategy that is set to be published as early as March. The administration must resist calls for a return to a strategy designed to win on two fronts simultaneously or in sequence. Right now, the United States can do a lot to support Ukraine, impose costs on Russia, and assure NATO allies without compromising its strategy to counter China. At the top of the list are accelerated deliveries of defensive military equipment to Ukraine—especially anti-armor, anti-ship, and air defense capabilities—as well as intelligence support and humanitarian assistance. If Russia does invade, Biden should get much more serious about sanctions than Obama was in 2014. Washington should target the wealth of Putin’s cronies in Western financial hubs, terminate Russian access to the SWIFT global payment system, prohibit transactions in Russian sovereign debt, sanction the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and cut off access to U.S. technology critical for industries favored by Putin, including defense. The Trump administration’s technology sanctions that have seriously hobbled the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei are an excellent precedent for this. The United States should also join NATO efforts to reinforce its eastern flank, including contributing U.S. troops to support the temporary activation and deployment of NATO’s Response Force. For this eventuality, the Biden administration has placed up to 8,500 U.S. military personnel on alert. But even as Washington reacts to Moscow’s threats to overturn the European security order, China and the Indo-Pacific must remain the primary focus of the United States’ strategic calculus. To that end, the administration should ensure sanctions do not inflict collateral damage on Indo-Pacific allies and partners. In particular, ensnaring India in Russia-focused sanctions for New Delhi’s planned purchase of the Russian S-400 air and missile defense system would be a mistake. Sanctions won’t stop the S-400 deal, but they would play into the narrative pushed by Moscow and Beijing that Washington is not a trustworthy partner for New Delhi. To keep its focus squarely on the Indo-Pacific, the United States must exercise restraint in what forces it sends to reinforce NATO should Putin invade Ukraine, and from where. Forces should not be taken from the Pacific. They should be relocated within Europe, from the United States, or from lower-priority theaters. For example, air and ground forces stationed in the Middle East could be moved to southeastern Europe to bolster NATO while remaining close enough to respond to any contingency. Deployment of an additional U.S. Army brigade combat team—of limited utility vis-à-vis China—may be sensible. But the Pentagon should avoid new, long-term deployments of assets in low supply, such as missile defense systems and advanced platforms for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Biden administration should also remember that allies provide the bricks, while the United States provides the mortar. NATO allies should contribute the bulk of any new forces deployed to guard the alliance’s eastern flank while the United States provides key military enablers such as command and control, logistics, and combat medicine. The good news is that allies are in fact stepping up: Denmark, France, Spain, and the Netherlands have all recently announced or proposed reinforcements of ships, fighter aircraft, and ground forces. Even as it responds to the crisis in Europe, Washington can take parallel steps to bolster deterrence in the Pacific—so that the current attention on Europe is not interpreted as a sign of weakness and distraction, as it was in 2014. For example, the Biden administration could announce plans to station a fifth and eventual sixth attack submarine in Guam. It could also back legislation on Capitol Hill to increase security assistance to Taiwan. Taking these steps during a crisis in Europe would send a powerful signal to Beijing and allied capitals that the United States’ priority on the Pacific perseveres. The Biden administration’s new defense strategy needs to confront the question of overstretch head-on. Given limited resources and the strength of the United States’ adversaries—especially China—the U.S. ability to prevail in a great-power conflict cannot be taken for granted. That’s why the administration must resist calls for a return to a strategy designed to win on two fronts simultaneously or in sequence. Such a force sizing is simply not realistic and would dilute the U.S. military’s focus on the Indo-Pacific as its priority theater, China as its pacing threat, and Taiwan as its pressing scenario. Critically, staying on track in the Pacific requires matching any new military commitments in Europe—even temporary ones—with new resources. The United States must not ask its military to do more with less or pretend that China and Russia can be deterred and confronted on the cheap. Now is not the time to cut defense spending as the Biden administration has proposed. Not when the U.S. military edge relative to China has so dangerously eroded. Not when inflation, aging platforms, rising personnel costs, and the failure to pass a budget on time are sapping the Pentagon’s buying power. The Biden administration and the U.S. Congress must provide the military with the sufficient, timely, and predictable funding demanded in these perilous times, and which U.S. service members deserve.

### Neg---DOD DA---Link

#### Security cooperation with NATO trades off with commitments to Asian allies

Bowne 18, Major, Judge Advocate in the US Air Force (Andrew, “Defending The New Fulda Gap: Deterring Russian Aggression Against The Baltic States Through Fiscal Legislation,” *Military Law Review*, 226.3)//BB

Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the precise amount of expenditures the United States commits directly to NATO, estimates by RAND Corporation and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) place the total costs of keeping U.S. forces in key industrial nations at less than $10 billion a year, or less than two percent of the total defense budget.58 While the United States increased defense spending by over eighty percent since 2001, “virtually none of that increase was generated by NATO commitments.”59 When compared to the defense posture the United States fielded in Europe during the Cold War, the resources currently obligated to defending Europe are remarkably low. In 1990, approximately fifteen percent of the total worldwide active strength was stationed in Europe, whereas only three percent of a significantly smaller total active force remains in Europe in 2017.60 Thus, despite the political rhetoric and fact that the United States spends more on defense than all other NATO members combined, it is clear the actual contribution to NATO is a relatively small portion of the overall U.S. defense budget. It is critical to understand the parameters of the United States’ contribution to NATO because the United States has finite resources, and, since enactment of the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011, legally binding caps on funding.61 Every dollar spent towards the objectives of NATO is, in theory, a dollar less going to fight the Islamic State or towards the Pacific pivot. However, the misunderstanding of the true costs of the United States’ role in NATO could have dangerous consequences. If the U.S. budgets and plans for NATO operations based on the false premise that it already spends too much and its partners do not contribute enough, U.S. leadership will likely make decisions that adversely affect its own national security interests.

#### NATO cyber-defense is enormously expensive

Sanger 16, White House and national security correspondent, and a senior writer @ NYT (David, “As Russian Hackers Probe, NATO Has No Clear Cyberwar Strategy,” *New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/17/world/europe/nato-russia-cyberwarfare.html)//BB>

At United States Cyber Command, which has expanded rapidly since the United States carried out cyberattacks against Iran in 2010, Russia’s networks are a regular target of surveillance. By next year, Cyber Command will have more than 130 teams fully in operation around the world, integrated into Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force units, in addition to teams that work alongside the National Security Agency at Fort Meade, Md. It has built up a vast early warning network, placing tens of thousands of “implants” — sensors that can also be used to insert malware — into networks around the world. But NATO is only beginning to explore what it delicately calls “active defense,” and says it is not focused on offensive cyberweapons. The Russians have no such compunctions. But it is unclear what Russian hackers hope to achieve here in the Baltics, other than to make the point, as they did in 2007 when they brought Estonia to an electronic halt, that they can get into any system, anytime. “Whatever the Russians have in mind — mostly intimidation — it usually fails,” said Estonia’s president, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, who grew up in New Jersey before coming here to turn this small NATO country into a pioneer in introducing new web-based technology for governing a nation. The 2007 attacks backfired, he noted, because they drove Estonians far more solidly into the European and NATO camps. In Sweden and Finland, neutral nations in the Cold War, the politics are more complex. As the NATO exercise began in Finland last week, the Finnish foreign minister was in Moscow, meeting his Russian counterpart, Sergey V. Lavrov. The more Sweden and Finland turn to NATO, the more their networks, their news sites and their government ministries come under cyberattack. As Adm. John Richardson, the chief of United States naval operations, said at an event at the Council on Foreign Relations in May, “The fact is it’s a pretty hot war in the cyber domain going on right now.” A hot war, but a kind that suits Russia well: It is part of what military strategists call “gray zone” combat. For Mr. Putin, cyberespionage and cyberattacks keep NATO and its partners off balance. They are enormously difficult and expensive to defend against, and, at least for now, they have operated below the line that is likely to prompt a military or economic response. “It stays below the radar,” Martin Libicki of the RAND Corporation told a conference sponsored this month by the NATO cyber center here, officially known as the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence. For the Russians, Mr. Libicki said, cyberespionage and weaponry are part of a larger strategy of information warfare and a blitz of propaganda that makes sorting out fact from fiction — say, the causes of the Malaysia Airlines crash in Ukraine — all the more difficult. But the attacks also remind the smaller nations here of their vulnerability, even if Russia’s troops stay on their side of the border. So far, NATO has found few effective means of deterring attacks.

#### Protection of critical infrastructure requires significant resources

Wolff 22, associate professor of cybersecurity policy at The Fletcher School at Tufts University (Josephine, “Why Russia Hasn't Launched Major Cyber Attacks Since the Invasion of Ukraine,” TIME Magazine, <https://time.com/6153902/russia-major-cyber-attacks-invasion-ukraine/)//BB>

It’s likely that the combined efforts of Microsoft, the U.S., and many other countries and companies to ramp up cyber defenses both in and outside of Ukraine has undoubtedly helped curb the damage caused by these efforts. But if Russia really had on hand a stockpile of previously undetected vulnerabilities and sophisticated malware designed to exploit them, these lines of defense simply would not be enough to prevent some significant damage and disruption. Updating critical infrastructure networks and systems is slow, expensive, complicated work and it’s impossible that every potential target has been hardened to the point where it is no longer vulnerable to Russian cyberattacks—unless those cyberattacks were never all that impressive to begin with.

### Neg---DOD DA---Link---AT SC is Cheap

#### Even if the plan seems cheap, it will outpace cost projections because of military squandering of resources

Munson 13, senior vice president for preventive services and global crisis management for a private sector corporation and a retired U.S. Marine Corps officer (Peter, “The Limits of Security Cooperation,” *War on the Rocks*, <https://warontherocks.com/2013/09/the-limits-of-security-cooperation/)//BB>

SC does work to build capacity in certain, relatively elite units that perceive a real need for improvement and hard training. Likewise, it works to build interoperability between already-capable partner forces and U.S. and coalition militaries. SC in the right doses can be a good way of showing solidarity with allies against other regional threats. But SC [Security Cooperation] is not a panacea and must be applied with significantly more discernment than the usual some-is-good-more-is-better logic of U.S. military spending. Planners should go to great lengths to ensure that SC is seen as a tool for a specific purpose, not a reward to condition behaviors. SC-as-a-conditioning-tool becomes bribery with diminishing returns. If policymakers want a quid pro quo, they need to admit as much and use much more precisely targeted incentives: paying a fee for access or head-of-the-line transit privileges for example. This becomes a much more predictable business transaction than trying to use SC funds, winks, and nudges to get one’s way. Finally, in the land of perverse incentives, SC is often seen as a means to drive defense business to U.S. contractors. This is true. By creating arms races and supplying prestige weapons, however useless, to unstable areas of the world, they are creating U.S. jobs. But wouldn’t taxpayer money and efforts be better spent if officials more precisely targeted domestic concerns with taxpayer funds rather than hoping that efforts trickle down predictably from collaboration with corpulent and unsavory foreign generals? In the land of perverse incentives, SC funding is one of the most egregious—and in the post-9/11 era, many officials see SC as a critical tool of strategic positioning. However, the premises of SC must be reconsidered before the U.S. military squanders more resources on white elephant projects.

### Neg---DOD DA---Link---AT Normal Means = Only O and M

#### The plan drains from all DoD coffers, not just O and M

Reynolds 19, et al, Commandant, Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies (Ronald, “The Management of Security Cooperation,” http://cebw.org/images/docs/Legislacao\_Webinar/Greenbook\_39\_0.pdf)//BB

The above 1973 historical quote highlights the evolution of SC and underscores the extraordinary changes to SC issued in by the FY 2017 NDAA. The increasing scope of SC activities to include all DoD international programs and those FAA/AECA authorized programs administered by DSCA is testament to increased DoD policy responsibilities and the imperative to develop the SC workforce. Execution of foreign policy in terms of SC reaches from the Secretary of Defense through DSCA to the CCMD, and finally to the in-country SDO/DATT, DAO and SCO. Increasingly, almost every community within DoD and its respective leadership is recognizing the role they play in SC and the pivotal role SC plays in achieving U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.

### Neg---DOD DA---IL---Resources Finite

#### The plan requires a forced choice to sacrifice resources and focus needed to defend Taiwan

Colby 22, co-founder and principal of The Marathon Initiative, a policy initiative focused on developing strategies to prepare the United States for an era of sustained great power competition. From 2018-2019, Colby was the Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security, where he led the Center’s work on defense issues. Before that, he served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development from 2017-2018. In that role, he served as the lead official in the development and rollout of the Department’s 2018 National Defense Strategy (Eldridge, “The U.S. Must Support Ukraine, But China Must Be Our Priority,” *TIME Magazine*, <https://time.com/6152096/us-support-ukraine-china-priority/>)

How should America respond to Russia’s abominable invasion of Ukraine? This is a question of immense importance. Right now, there is more heat than light in the discussion. Given the momentous stakes, Americans must respond to this crisis with clarity of mind and sobriety. Moscow’s invasion is likely to be a hinge point in history. If nothing else, it lays to rest the idea that history is over, that power politics and the threat of war are gone from the developed areas of the world. This is sad, but it is a reality. In developing our response to Russia’s brazen act, we must face and adapt to this reality. For too long, we have discounted the hard facts of international politics. But now America must look at the world situation much more soberly and strategically, proceeding from these hard facts rather than ignoring them or wishing them away. Above all, our response must be strategic—it must match our response to the threats we face in light of our resources and the risks we are willing to take on. The reality is that we face multiple serious threats in different parts of the world. The danger Russia poses, including to our NATO allies, is now very clear. But others have not gone away. We also must consider Iran, North Korea, transnational terrorists like al Qaeda, and, above all, the threat of a China that seeks first hegemony over Asia and then global preeminence. So far this is familiar. Less familiar but absolutely critical is the fact that we do not have a military large or capable enough to fight major wars against Russia and China in even roughly concurrent timelines. It is true that Europe is mainly a land theater and the Western Pacific is mainly a maritime one. But many of the things our forces would need to defeat Russia or China are needed in both theaters—like heavy penetrating bombers, attack submarines, advanced munitions, air defenses, and survivable intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. Even certain assets once thought most appropriate or necessary for Europe may well play a critical role in a fight against China, such as Army long-range missiles and artillery. These and other capabilities like them would be just as vital for beating back a Russian assault as they would be for denying a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan—and are already in short supply. Unfortunately, this is not a problem that we can solve easily, quickly, or cheaply. We should seek to redress it, but, even if we muster the will, it will take years and a significantly larger defense budget to build more of the things we need to fight a major war, like penetrating heavy bombers and nuclear-powered attack submarines. In the meantime, what we do have can only be used in one place at a time. A missile used in Europe can’t be used in Asia, and a bomber lost over Europe will take years to be replaced. We do also have an unparalleled network of allies. But a similar problem confronts us here. In theory our alliance network is far stronger than the threats we face. But in reality few of our allies have significant militaries, and it will take those that don’t significant time to develop their armed forces even if they gather the resolve. Over the long term, then, our strategy should be clear. We should reshape our military to field far more of the kinds of systems needed to fight a great power war and, with a few exceptions like sustaining our ongoing counterterrorism efforts, dispense with those elements that are ill-suited for it. Meantime, we should press and encourage our allies, especially Japan, Germany, and Taiwan, to build up their conventional defenses, and fully enable those, like Poland, Australia, and the United Kingdom, willing to do more for their and others’ defense. But this strategy will take time to bear fruit. This is the strategy the 2018 National Defense Strategy called for—yet four years later, due to factors ranging from inertia through political and bureaucratic resistance to allied footdragging, we still have a long way to go. In the coming years, then, we face what Henry Kissinger called “the necessity for choice.” We don’t have enough of the right military might to cover all the threats to our interests. So we must prioritize. This is far from unprecedented. The U.S. and Britain faced this dilemma in 1941, and elected a “Europe first” strategy, prioritizing defeating much stronger Nazi Germany before Imperial Japan. Similarly today, America must prioritize addressing the threat China poses in Asia. Asia is the world’s “decisive theater” and China by far the most powerful other state in the world. If China attains its goal of becoming dominant over Asia, it will control over half of the global economy. Americans’ fundamental liberties and prosperity will suffer grievously. This is the most dangerous outcome for Americans, and preventing it must be the priority of our foreign policy. In practical military terms, this means that we must ensure enough of the right military forces—bombers, submarines, munitions, ISR, and the like—are ready and available to defend Taiwan, and on relatively short notice. Taiwan is China’s best target for breaking apart the anti-hegemonic coalition that is the only way we can prevent Beijing from dominating Asia. If China seizes Taiwan, it will deal this coalition a huge—possibly mortal—blow. We cannot allow this. And, crucially, this is a problem right now. We don’t know Beijing’s assessment of the People’s Liberation Army’s ability to seize Taiwan. But we do know that America’s ability to defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan has eroded very substantially in recent years, that it is continuing to erode, and that Beijing’s perceptions of its ability to take the island would rise dramatically if it knew we had expended or tied down critical parts of our military in or for Europe. In other words, we are in or very close to the window where a successful Chinese attack on Taiwan is possible, and we must hedge against this risk.

#### The plan specifically trades off with resources needed to deter China

[the counterplan defuses threats to NATO without requiring military spending]

Blackwill and Fontaine 22, senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, \*\*Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security (Robert and Richard, “Ukraine War Should Slow But Not Stop the U.S. Pivot to Asia,” *Bloomberg*, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-03-09/russia-s-ukraine-invasion-should-slow-not-stop-u-s-pivot-to-china)//BB>

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has upended this approach. Now Washington must deal with revisionist great powers in two regions, while the Middle East also continues to demand attention. The U.S. should continue a long-term shift to Asia, but in a way that better balances resources and engagements across the three strategic theaters. Paradoxically, Putin’s aggression demonstrates how this should be done. First, policy makers should absorb the enduring strategic logic behind a pivot to Asia. China combines the greatest capability and will to upend the international order. The Indo-Pacific represents the primary, but not the only, regional theater in which U.S.-China competition takes place. But a sustainable pivot to Asia is possible only in the absence of serious national security crises in Europe and the Middle East. No U.S. president will ignore a Russian-induced emergency in Europe, a major terrorist threat, or a nuclear and/or hegemonic Iran. America remains a global and not a regional power. The central challenge is allocating national security resources across all three regions, without either weakening vital U.S. national interests in one or imagining that America can do everything, everywhere. That problem is most acute in the military sphere. An increase in defense spending will be required, but how that money is spent is equally important. In the Middle East, for example, regular troops should relieve the burden placed on elite special operations forces in security cooperation missions. Washington should move expensive military equipment — like F-35 and F-22 aircraft — to the two arenas of great-power competition, employing less-capable aircraft, including unmanned systems, for counterterrorism missions. A combination of regional diplomacy and continued deterrence could limit Iran's regional ambitions, freeing up some of the forces that have deployed to the Middle East in recent years to deter a potential Iran threat. In Europe, the U.S. should build on its allies’ newfound willingness to enhance their military capabilities and deter further Russian aggression. This should involve moving American troops currently stationed in Europe further east, to countries such as Poland, Romania and the Baltics. Washington should also capitalize on the recent increase in intelligence sharing – including to NATO non-members – by eliminating barriers to sharing defense technology with allies newly willing to invest. For the Indo-Pacific, Washington should reserve the lion's share of military resources that matter most, including smaller naval surface ships, long-range missiles and next-generation fighter aircraft. Building on efforts like the Aukus security arrangement with Australia and the U.K. would give regional allies more leverage to strengthen their own defense, helping them better deter China and serve as the frontline in daily competition with it. Diplomatic resources are less zero-sum than military power, and economic engagement less still. Intense diplomatic work in Europe and the Middle East could bolster the coalitions in each that are willing and able to deal with threats there, and potentially reduce some of the threats themselves. Washington should couple this with an affirmative economic agenda, beginning with re-entry to or renegotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement.

#### Funding for Taiwan requires tradeoffs from other areas

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Finally, the hefty price tag of an unqualified commitment to protect Taiwan would need to be traded off against other potential investments. The United States must keep its eye firmly on the larger contest: the broad-based competition of systems and societies emerging with the PRC. Historical lessons on the character of such competitions,[53] the geo-economic character of a wider contest defined by the difficulty of military conquest, and China’s emphasis on gradual, non-military tools of influence suggest that global economic engagement, technological rivalries, investments in diplomatic capability, and information security and cyber capabilities will be more important to the outcome of the larger competition than the status of Taiwan. At a time, for example, when the central office charged with overseeing US cybersecurity has been described as “underfunded, outmatched and exhausted”,[54] it does not make sense to pour tens of billions into capabilities oriented for the defence of Taiwan.

### Neg---DOD DA---!---Turns Case

#### Strategic overstretch causes the US military to fail in both Europe and Asia

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Providing temporary reinforcements is the right decision today in the face of Russia’s bald aggression. But the United States should resist the inclination to revive its role as the military protector of Europe, especially since Europe is awakening to its responsibilities. Britain is sending troops to the Baltic states and Poland. France is pushing “strategic autonomy” for the European Union. And days after halting the Nord Stream 2 pipeline supplying natural gas from Russia, Germany reversed a long-standing ban on providing military assistance and sent weapons to Ukraine. Germany also vowed to spend more than 2 percent of its economy on defense, finally committing to meet NATO’s target. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared his country, and Europe, to have reached a “historic turning point.” Both Americans and Europeans would benefit if Scholz’s words prove true. In the coming years, European states should move to take the lead in their collective defense, and the United States should do everything possible to encourage them. To stake the defense of Europe on the United States, over the next decade and beyond, would be to answer Putin’s rash gamble with a slow-moving gamble of our own. It might seem as though the United States will remain able and willing to protect all of NATO’s 28 European countries far into the future. After all, America has orchestrated Europe’s defense for the past eight decades. Yet it did so under two markedly different conditions. During World War II and the Cold War, the United States sought to stop totalitarian powers from conquering the region. An Axis or Soviet takeover of Europe would have closed off the entire continent to liberal, American-style interaction and influence, and put the Western Hemisphere on the defensive. After the Cold War, however, as the Soviet threat collapsed, the United States recommitted to Europe not because the stakes were high but arguably because they were low. Threats were so negligible that it seemed U.S. leadership could keep things that way through modest exertion — and spread democracy to boot. Expanding NATO eastward, American officials convinced themselves that what had been a military alliance was more comparable to a political club, one that need not become an adversary of Russia. Russia’s assault on Ukraine ends that chapter and begins a new one. The prospect of further Russian aggression in Eastern Europe cannot be dismissed as negligible, as it was in the 1990s or 2000s. At the same time, Russia poses far less a threat to overrun Europe and threaten American security or prosperity than the Soviet Union did. After all, the Russian economy is roughly one-fifth the size of that of the European Union, and that was before the severe sanctions of the past week. Although Russia has built a formidable military, one that enables it to launch wars like that in Ukraine, NATO’s European members collectively outspend Russia on defense. During the Cold War, by contrast, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact boasted land forces superior in number to those of NATO (including the U.S. share), and the gap between its economic output and that of Western Europe was several times smaller than Russia’s shortfall today. In the security environment now emerging, with Russia menacing Eastern Europe, the United States is set to face major costs and the ultimate risk: great-power war between nuclear peers. Yet the threat Russia poses remains one that Europeans could handle themselves, with America acting as a supporter rather than the leader. The United States remains a superpower. Why shouldn’t it be the main counterweight in Europe to Moscow? There are two reasons both the United States and Europe would be better off if it declined this role. One lies in Beijing, and the other in Washington. The United States has already identified China as its primary rival, embarking on “strategic competition” with the world’s number-two power. Taking on China and Russia at once would be unwise and likely impossible. True, the Pentagon has previously planned to fight two wars at once, but those wars were envisioned as “regional” conflicts against small states like Iran, Iraq or North Korea. In practice, the United States had difficulty prosecuting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously. China and Russia represent challenges of a far greater magnitude, which explains why the Pentagon abandoned its two-war standard in 2018, even as its budget has grown. If the United States doubles down on European security while leading the charge in Asia, it may either fall short in both places or default on its commitments in Europe just when they come due.

#### China-Taiwan war trigger widespread cyber conflict [assistance solves]

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The prospect of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan echoes some of the most disastrous 20th century instances of great power expansion—reminiscent, perhaps, of Nazi Germany’s Anschluss or even its subsequent invasion of Poland. Given that the latter ignited World War II, America’s strategic community has been rightly fixated on the vast military and political contingencies of a Chinese invasion that would remake Asia. But Taiwan is not just the geopolitical fulcrum of the Indo-Pacific; it is also the nexus of a rapidly evolving Sino-American technological competition. And if 20th century great power competition is any guide, tech races are just as important to long-term competition as territorial military contests. The U.S. needs to act now to secure the technological dimensions of a looming Taiwan crisis, or risk losing far more than the island. In the domain of Sino-American tech rivalry, Taiwan is unique in two aspects: First, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) remains the world’s tightest bottleneck in the global high-tech ecosystem, with exclusive capabilities to construct the most valuable, sophisticated computer chips in existence. Second, military conflagration in Taiwan would represent a hitherto-unknown level of cyber-intensive military conflict, the seeds of which likely have already been planted. Both of these realities demand unprecedented cooperation between the United States and Taiwan—cooperation that requires significant trust and openness in Taipei and significant counter-espionage and national security assistance from Washington.

### Neg---DOD DA---!---AT Doesn’t Draw in US

#### China-Taiwan conflict draws in the US

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Any conflict over Taiwan would probably draw in the US homeland. It would most probably escalate in cyber terms, with China going after a range of US critical infrastructure, especially anything directly supporting military deployments. Emerging technologies would also allow Beijing to strike kinetically at the United States — with long-range hypersonic weapons, ‘Trojan Horse’ missiles hidden in shipping containers prepositioned in US ports,[49] or very long-range drones. Discussions of a Taiwan scenario sometimes treat it as a sort of twenty-first century Gulf War, with US forces deployed far from home to win a conflict from which the American people are largely insulated. A war with China will be nothing like that. If mutual homeland attacks do begin, the conflict is bound to escalate.

#### If the US doesn’t get involved, that triggers wildfire prolif and war

Sacks 22, research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the author of a recent CFR paper, “Enhancing U.S.-Japan Coordination for a Taiwan Conflict.” (David, interviewed by Jongsoo Lee, “Taiwan Strait: What Is at Stake and How to Prevent a Conflict,” *The Diplomat*, https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/taiwan-strait-what-is-at-stake-and-how-to-prevent-a-conflict/)//BB

The immediate stakes in the Taiwan Strait are clear, but the biggest shift I’ve seen in recent years is a growing recognition that what happens in the Taiwan Strait will have enormous ramifications for the entire Indo-Pacific. In my view, a growing number of policymakers have correctly concluded that if the United States were to stand aside in the face of a Chinese attack on Taiwan, its allies and partners would come to question whether they could rely on the United States for their security. Those countries would then either accommodate China or hedge against it by growing their militaries and developing nuclear weapons. Either development would result in diminished U.S. influence and increasing instability. Ultimately, unanswered Chinese aggression against Taiwan could very well precipitate the establishment of a Chinese-led order in the region most critical to America’s continued security and prosperity.

### Aff--- DOD DA---Ukraine Thumper + Not Zero-Sum

#### Ukraine thumps the Asia pivot AND it’s not zero-sum

Madhani and Megerian 3-17-2022 (Aamer and Chris, “Biden’s China ‘pivot’ complicated by Russia’s war in Ukraine,” AP News, <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-biden-business-china-d47d4b2215de708b55a12bc4b648818d)//BB>

President Joe Biden set out to finally complete the “pivot to Asia,” a long-sought adjustment of U.S. foreign policy to better reflect the rise of America’s most significant military and economic competitor: China. But Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine has made that vexing move even more complicated. China’s government has vacillated between full embrace and more measured responses as Russian President Vladimir Putin prosecutes his war, making the decisions for Biden far more layered. Biden and China’s Xi Jinping are scheduled to speak by phone on Friday, a conversation that the White House says will center on “managing the competition between our two countries as well as Russia’s war against Ukraine and other issues of mutual concern.” The Biden administration is left needing to focus east and west at the same time, balancing not simply economic imperatives but military ones as well. “It’s difficult. It’s expensive,” Kurt Campbell, the coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs on the White House National Security Council, said during a recent forum of maintaining a high-level U.S. focus in two regions. “But it’s also essential, and I believe we’re entering a period where that’s what will be required of the United States and of this generation of Americans.” Biden has been deeply invested in rallying NATO and Western allies to respond to Russia with crippling sanctions, supplying an overmatched Ukraine military with $2 billion in military assistance — including $800 million in new aid announced Wednesday — and addressing a growing humanitarian crisis. Eastern flank NATO allies, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, have made clear to the Biden administration that they want the U.S. to increase its military presence in the region and do more to address the worst humanitarian crisis in Europe since World War II. More than 3 million Ukrainian refugees have fled their country in recent weeks. Though the war in Ukraine has dominated Biden’s focus of late, White House officials insist they haven’t lost sight of China — and are watching intently to see how Xi decides to play his hand.

#### Distraction now AND the military is unprepared in Asia

Mark Montgomery and Bradley Bowman 3-8-2022, Retired U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He previously served as policy director of the Senate Armed Services Committee under Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz. His last Navy assignment was as director of operations for U.S. Pacific Command. Bradley Bowman is senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at FDD. He served as a national security adviser to members of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, as well as an active duty U.S. Army officer, Black Hawk pilot and assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy. (“Apply the lessons from Ukraine in the Taiwan Strait,” Defense News, <https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/03/08/nine-lessons-from-ukraine-to-apply-in-the-taiwan-strait/)//BB>

With the world’s attention fixed on the national security and humanitarian catastrophe in Ukraine caused by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s unprovoked invasion, a similar disaster is brewing in the Pacific. Taking a page from Putin’s playbook, the Chinese Communist Party, or CCP, is methodically assembling combat power to coerce or conquer the free people of Taiwan. Preventing that from happening will require Washington to learn the right lessons from the disaster in Ukraine. Among them is the need for Washington to spend less time worrying about provoking authoritarian bullies and more time working to defend threatened democracies before the invasion starts. This is especially critical as U.S. forces are much more likely to be directly involved in a response to coercion against Taiwan. For 25 years, Beijing has pursued a determined strategy featuring military modernization, technological advancements, economic infiltration, cyberattacks and persistent disinformation campaigns. These efforts have focused on building a world-class military, erasing American military supremacy in the seas and skies around Taiwan, and preparing for a potential attack designed to establish CCP dominion over Taiwan. Meanwhile, the United States has been distracted elsewhere, unable to focus its strategic and fiscal efforts on the rising power in China. This has been compounded by consistent congressional failures to provide the Pentagon with the timely, sufficient and predictable funding necessary to modernize U.S. forces and maintain sufficient readiness and capacity. Indeed, the Department of Defense has received on-time funding only once in the last 13 fiscal years. Exacerbating these dynamics, Washington has been slow in addressing serious concerns and specific requests for resources identified by Indo-Pacific Command in successive reports to Congress. Just last year, the command again warned that the military balance of power in the region continues to become “more unfavorable” for America and its allies.

#### Security Cooperation with Ukraine is high now

DoS, US Department of State, 5-6-2022 (“U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine,” <https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine/)//BB>

The United States, our allies, and our partners worldwide are united in support of Ukraine in response to Russia’s premeditated, unprovoked, and unjustified war against Ukraine. We have not forgotten Russia’s earlier aggression in eastern Ukraine and occupation following its unlawful seizure of Crimea in 2014. The United States reaffirms its unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, extending to its territorial waters. Ukraine is a key regional strategic partner that has undertaken significant efforts to modernize its military and increase its interoperability with NATO. It remains an urgent security assistance priority to provide Ukraine the equipment it needs to defend itself against Russia’s war against Ukraine. Since January 2021, the United States has invested more than $4.5 billion in security assistance to demonstrate our enduring and steadfast commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This includes more than $3.8 billion since Russia’s launched its premeditated, unprovoked, and brutal war against Ukraine on February 24. Since 2014, the United States has provided more than $6.5 billion in security assistance for training and equipment to help Ukraine preserve its territorial integrity, secure its borders, and improve interoperability with NATO. United States security assistance committed to Ukraine includes: Over 1,400 Stinger anti-aircraft systems; Over 5,500 Javelin anti-armor systems; Over 14,000 other anti-armor systems; Over 700 Switchblade Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems; 90 155mm Howitzers and 184,000 155mm artillery rounds; 72 Tactical Vehicles to tow 155mm Howitzers; 16 Mi-17 helicopters; Hundreds of Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles; 200 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers; Over 7,000 small arms; Over 50,000,000 rounds of ammunition; 75,000 sets of body armor and helmets; Laser-guided rocket systems; Puma Unmanned Aerial Systems; Phoenix Ghost Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems; Unmanned Coastal Defense Vessels; 17 counter-artillery radars; Four counter-mortar radars; Two air surveillance radars; M18A1 Claymore anti-personnel munitions; C-4 explosives and demolition equipment for obstacle clearing; Tactical secure communications systems; Night vision devices, thermal imagery systems, optics, and laser rangefinders; Commercial satellite imagery services; Explosive ordnance disposal protective gear; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear protective equipment; Medical supplies to include first aid kits; Electronic jamming equipment; Field equipment and spare parts. Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) Pursuant to a delegation by the President, we have used the emergency Presidential Drawdown Authority on eight occasions since September 2021 to provide Ukraine $3.4 billion in military assistance directly from DoD stockpiles.

#### The US can focus on both regions at once

Kroenig 22, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University (Matthew, “Washington Must Prepare for War With Both Russia and China,” *Foreign Policy*, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/18/us-russia-china-war-nato-quadrilateral-security-dialogue/)//BB>

As Russia threatens the largest land invasion in Europe since World War II, the most consequential strategic question of the 21st century is becoming clear: How can the United States manage two revisionist, autocratic, nuclear-armed great powers (Russia and China) simultaneously? The answer, according to many politicians and defense experts, is that Washington must moderate its response to Russia in Europe to focus on the greater threat posed by China in the Indo-Pacific. This would be a mistake. The United States remains the world’s leading power with global interests, and it cannot afford to choose between Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Instead, Washington and its allies should develop a defense strategy capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating Russia and China at the same time. In recent weeks, Biden has sent several thousand U.S. troops to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank—and for good reason. A major war in Ukraine could spill across international boundaries and threaten the seven NATO allies that border Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Moreover, if Russian President Vladimir Putin succeeds in Ukraine, why would he stop there? Putin has shown a clear interest in resurrecting the former Russian Empire, and other vulnerable Eastern European countries—Poland, Romania, or the Baltic states—might be next. A successful Russian incursion into a NATO ally’s territory could mean the end of the Western alliance and the credibility of U.S. security commitments globally. The threat posed by China is also serious. Adm. Philip Davidson, former commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, predicted China could invade Taiwan within the next six years. This is a war the United States might lose. If China succeeds in taking Taiwan, it would be well on its way to disrupting the U.S.-led order in Asia, with an eye to doing the same globally. Moreover, Russia and China are increasingly working together. As this month’s summit between Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping shows, Moscow and Beijing are forging a closer strategic partnership, including on military matters. These dictators could coordinate dual attacks on the U.S. alliance structure or opportunistically seize on the distraction provided by the other’s aggression. In other words, there is a serious risk of simultaneous major-power wars in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. To address this problem, many have proposed answers that simply will not work. The Biden administration initially hoped to put relations with Russia on a “stable and predictable” footing to focus on China, but Putin had other ideas, as the world is now seeing in Ukraine. Unfortunately, Washington does not get to decide how its adversaries sequence their aggression. Others have expressed hope that Washington can peel these powers apart or even align with Russia against China, but these are not realistic solutions. The misguided view gaining the most recent acceptance, however, is that Washington should simply choose the Indo-Pacific over Europe. Politicians and experts argue that the United States lacks the resources to take on both Russia and China. They point to China’s power and Asia’s wealth and argue that Asia should be the priority. While Washington pivots to Asia, wealthy European countries, such as Germany, should step up to provide for NATO’s defense. Indeed, the Biden administration’s National Defense Strategy, which has been delayed due to the Ukraine crisis, is expected to focus on China without offering a clear solution to the two-front-war problem. A good strategy starts with clear goals—and Washington’s objectives are to maintain peace and stability in both Europe and Asia. A good strategy, however, starts with clear goals, and Washington’s objectives are to maintain peace and stability in both Europe and Asia. U.S. interests in Europe are too significant to let them be worked out solely between Putin and the United States’ European allies. Indeed, the European Union, not Asia, is the United States’ largest trade and investment partner, and this imbalance is much starker when China (which the United States seeks greater economic decoupling from), is removed from the equation. Furthermore, China has conducted military exercises in Europe and the Middle East. Competing with China militarily means competing globally, not just in Asia. In addition, Xi is gauging U.S. resolve, and a weak response in Ukraine might make a Chinese move on Taiwan more likely. Moreover, the United States is not France; it is not compelled to make gut-wrenching strategic choices about its national security due to constrained resources. In short, publishing a defense strategy that can only handle one of the United States’ great-power rivals (which is what is expected from the forthcoming national defense strategy) is planning to fail.

### Aff---DOD DA---No Link

#### Plan’s funding comes from O and M or new appropriation

Reynolds 19, et al, Commandant, Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies (Ronald, “The Management of Security Cooperation,” http://cebw.org/images/docs/Legislacao\_Webinar/Greenbook\_39\_0.pdf

Under the authority of Title 10, Chapter 16, and/or the current National Defense Authorization Act, DoD provides material assistance and related training to partner nations to develop specific capabilities and/or capacities. This is normally done using DoD Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding, but in some instances Congress appropriates additional funding for DoD to conduct these programs. Although it is DoD funding, these programs, and all security cooperation, must be coordinated with DoS. Security Cooperation practitioners refer to these programs as Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs and execute them using a pseudo Letter of Offer and Acceptance. All BPC programs require congressional notification. Below are just a few examples. Examples with four digits in quotes represent temporary authorities whose authorizations can be found in various National Defense Authorizations Acts.

#### It's cheap

Kelly 10, principal mathematician at the RAND Corporation (Terrence, et al, “Security Cooperation Organizations in the Country Team: Options for Success,” RAND, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA517323.pdf)//BB>

The United States conducts a wide range of security cooperation missions and initiatives that can serve as key enablers of U.S. foreign policy efforts to assist and influence other countries. For a relatively small investment, security cooperation programs can play an important role by shaping the security environment and laying the groundwork for future stability operations with allies and partners. Security cooperation,1 in the form of noncombat military-to-military activities, includes “normal” peacetime activities, such as building the long-term institutional and operational capabilities and capacity of key partners and allies, establishing and deepening relationships between the United States and partner militaries, and securing access to critical areas overseas. Security cooperation also can include conducting quasi-operational efforts, such as helping U.S. partners and allies manage their own internal defense.

### Aff---DOD DA---No China War

#### **No US-China war**

Lei 20, PhD and MA in International Politics, associate research fellow with the China Institute of International Studies. (Cui, 7-24-2020, "Despite heated talk, risk of a US-China hot war is small", *South China Morning Post*, <https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3094121/why-risk-us-china-hot-war-small-despite-heated-talk>)

Many observers are pessimistic about deteriorating US-China relations and believe the two countries are heading towards a cold war. Even worse, some argue that the situation might be more dangerous than the US-Soviet Union Cold War, and that a hot war might break out between the two. This argument is unconvincing. First of all, deterrents to a flare-up are much stronger in US-China relations than in US-Soviet relations. Although economic and people-to-people ties between China and the US are declining, they are still close compared to US-Soviet ties. It is hard to decouple two closely intertwined economies and societies. Take two examples. China is expected to become the world's largest consumer market, a temptation hard to resist for exporters, including those from the US. And in education, more than 300,000 Chinese students study in the US, bringing in huge revenues for the US education industry. Many universities go to great lengths to woo international students. Recently Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology even sued the government over its new visa restrictions, now aborted, on international students. Second, even if there is decoupling, the pain would not be too great and can be kept out of the national security sphere if properly handled. In fact, for national security reasons, a modest degree of isolation will make both sides more secure and comfortable. For instance, if China’s information technology equipment cannot capture Western markets, the US will be more relaxed. If China cannot get advanced technologies from the US and its technological progress slows down, the US will be less anxious. In the same vein, China feels assured knowing that if the Trump administration does impose a travel ban on Communist Party members, it would be abandoning one of the tools available to the US to promote “peaceful evolution” in China. Economic decoupling is undeniably more painful for China than for the US. But unlike Japan during WWII, which was hit hard by the US oil embargo because of its lack of natural resources, China has no such problems. Given its large domestic market, losing the US as a major customer is not a disaster for China, and can be compensated through more dynamic economic activities at home. China can also make up for being freezed out of technological exchanges by turning to indigenous innovation. As for the US, it can import goods from other developing countries, albeit less cheaply. The relative loss is acceptable when weighed against the heightened perception of economic independence and security. Third, the ideological confrontation between China and the US is less intense than that during the Cold War. Unlike the obsession with ideology in those days, the line between capitalism and socialism is blurred today. The market economy has become universally recognised as the best way to promote economic growth and, politically, many countries have embraced democracy. Even North Korea calls itself the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Although ideological hawks in the US still long for the day when the beacon of freedom will light up the world, after many years of fighting bloody wars overseas, most American people are not interested in promoting democracy abroad. Meanwhile, China just wants to preserve its political system and has no interest in exporting it to other countries, as the Soviet Union did. Thus, ideological antagonism in China-US relations can easily be eased by calculations of realistic interests, which create conditions for compromise and cooperation. Fourth, both China and the US have many options other than war to achieve their policy goals. While they have no allies to serve as a buffer, given the nature of the potential conflict in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait, both countries are adept at operating in grey zones and fighting psychological, public opinion or diplomatic warfare below the threshold of war. The forced closure of the Chinese consulate in Houston by the US government is just the latest act of brinkmanship. In addition, given China’s huge economic and financial interests in the US, the latter can wield the stick of sanctions when use of force is highly risky or not worth it. When both sides have many tools and options, why would they rush to war to achieve their goals? Last but not least, the imbalance of power will act as a deterrent. Some say the US and Soviet Union did not fight a hot war because they were evenly matched. It was not the case, actually. At the beginning of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was at a relative military disadvantage. Moreover, a country needs the will to fight before going to war, even if it is stronger militarily than its adversary. Having fought years of meaningless wars, the US is weary of war. China, too, abhors war. Having a clear understanding of US strength, especially when its own economy is slowing down and it is facing various domestic challenges, China would not wish to recklessly start a war with the US. In summary, the possibility of a hot war between China and the US is very small. The greatest danger for China is not a cold or hot confrontation with the US, but policymakers’ interpretation of the momentary hostility towards Beijing of a portion of the American population and the larger world. An erroneous interpretation could end China’s march to further opening up, and see it turn instead towards self-isolation.

### Aff---DOD DA---War Turns DA

#### War turns the DA---a new conflict is a significant drag on Asian deterrence

Magsamen 19, vice president for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress and Michael Fuchs, senior fellow, (Kelly, “The Case for a New U.S. Relationship with Afghanistan,” *Center for American Progress*, <https://americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/New-Relationship-w-Afghanistan-final.pdf)//BB>

• Opportunity cost #5: Two decades of military conflict have eroded U.S. military readiness. While the U.S. military has global responsibilities, it has finite resources, and nothing drains U.S. military readiness like an active war, as made clear by the 2017 report of a Task Force on Defense Personnel co-chaired by former U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and former National Security Adviser James Jones.39 For the Pentagon, prosecuting the war in Afghanistan is a top-level priority that requires significant time from its top officials as well as tremendous resources—from regular rotations of thousands of personnel to equipment to budget expenditures. With pressing needs to bolster U.S. force posture in Asia and Europe to deter threats from Russia and China and adapt the military to emerging threats such as cybersecurity, the U.S. military will have a difficult time dedicating the necessary attention and resources to these threats while fighting an indefinite war with roughly 14,000 troops in Afghanistan.